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Abstract
I test the predictions from Duca, Montero, Riggi and Zizza (2017), who develop a customer-
market model with consumer switching costs and capital-market imperfections in which 
price-cost markups behave countercyclically, with a subsample of European fi rms 
participating in the Wage Dynamics Network 2014 survey. I use a novel empirical approach 
developed by Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) for estimating discrete choice models 
with binary endogenous regressors that allows for selection on unobservables. Results 
show that fi rms subject to fi nancial constraints had a signifi cantly higher probability of 
raising markups than in a counterfactual scenario without such constraints. Moreover, the 
estimated partial effects for the main variables are in overall accordance with the predictions 
from the theoretical model.
Keywords: markups, fi nancial frictions, customer market, discrete-choice models.
JEL classifi cation: C25, C26, D22, L11.
Resumen
En este trabajo se contrastan las predicciones teóricas del modelo elaborado por Duca, 
Montero, Riggi y Zizza (2017). Este es un modelo de mercados de clientes (customer 
markets) con costes de cambio de proveedor (switching costs) e imperfecciones en los 
mercados de capitales, en el cual los márgenes precio-coste se comportan de manera 
contracíclica (es decir, aumentan durante las recesiones). Para el análisis empírico se 
utiliza una submuestra de empresas europeas participantes en la edición de 2014 de la 
encuesta de la Wage Dynamics Network. Además, se emplea una metodología empírica 
novedosa desarrollada en Aakvik, Heckman y Vytlacil (2005) que permite la estimación de 
modelos de elección discreta con variables binarias endógenas y controlar por la posible 
presencia de sesgos de selección por factores inobservables. Los resultados muestran que 
las empresas europeas que estuvieron sometidas a restricciones fi nancieras tuvieron una 
mayor probabilidad de elevar sus márgenes que en un escenario contrafactual sin tales 
restricciones. Además, en general el efecto estimado de los principales determinantes de la 
probabilidad de aumentar los márgenes tiende a coincidir con las predicciones del modelo 
teórico.
Palabras clave: márgenes precio-coste, fricciones fi nancieras, mercados de clientes, 
modelos de elección discreta.
Códigos JEL: C25, C26, D22, L11.
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1 Introduction 
The European economy experienced a deep and persistent economic and financial crisis 
during the period 2010-2013. However, inflation did not fall as much as predicted by 
standard economic theory, as documented by Gilchrist et al. (2016) and Antoun de 
Almeida (2015). Importantly, this lack of significant disinflation occurred against a 
backdrop of severe financial shocks that generated substantial economic dislocation 
throughout the European economies. Gilchrist et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence 
that shows that between 2009 and 2013 inflation in the euro area periphery –those 
countries most exposed to the financial shocks– was influenced importantly by the severe 
disruptions in the credit intermediation process. More specifically, they find that the 
residuals from a Phillips curve-type relationship for a panel of euro area countries are 
systematically related to several indicators of business credit conditions. 
As suggested by Yellen (2016), there are some driving forces of inflation that are not 
well understood yet, featuring prominently the declining influence of labor market 
conditions on inflation in recent years. Several recent papers have addressed this puzzling 
behavior of prices during the crisis paying attention to different dimensions of the 
inflation process.1 This paper attempts to contribute to this literature by focusing on the 
role of financial frictions in firms’ pricing decisions, which is the subject of an active 
ongoing research effort.2 To this end, I start from the theoretical model developed by Duca 
et al. (2017), which will guide the empirical analysis and help in interpreting the different 
mechanisms at work. This is a customer-market model with consumer switching costs and 
capital-market imperfections very similar to that in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). 
Intuitively, in periods of low demand firms are more likely to be liquidity constrained. In 
this setting, firms operating in a customer-market framework may find it optimal to 
increase their prices to boost short run profits and sacrifice future sales, since the 
possibility of default makes firms care less about the future. 
Duca et al. (2017) introduce two additional mechanisms that magnify the effects of 
financial frictions on markup countercyclicality. The first one is the possibility of 
persistence in demand shocks. This is a relevant feature in view of the exceptional 
persistence of the shocks affecting the European economy over 2010–2013, as stressed in 
                                                        
1 See e.g. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) and the references therein. 
2 See inter alia Gilchrist et al. (2017) and Duca et al. (2017) and the references therein. 
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e.g. ECB (2014). According to the theoretical model, higher expected persistence tends to 
augment the effects of financial constraints by strengthening the trade-off between short- 
and long-run profits. When the negative demand shock is expected to persist in the future, 
it is less profitable to lower current prices to increase market share and future profits.  
The second extension, which also reinforces that trade-off, consists in allowing a 
procyclical elasticity of demand, so that firms perceive stronger competition in expansions 
than during downturns, a point that dates back to Robinson (1933). As the elasticity of 
demand falls in a downturn, firms become insulated from competition because the gain 
from a given price cut becomes smaller, which reduces the benefit from investing in 
market shares and, thus, long-run profits. Arguably, this is also a relevant feature of the 
European economy that should be taken into account, as the degree of competition might 
have decreased over the crisis as a result of an increase in the rate of business destruction 
which would have bolstered surviving firms’ market power. 
In this paper, I study these predictions with a subsample of European firms 
participating in the third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey carried out 
in 2014 by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), covering firms from 25 ESCB 
countries and from a wide range of sectors. The survey consists almost exclusively of 
qualitative questions and is particularly suitable for the purpose of this paper, as 
companies are asked directly how they changed their price-cost margins over the period 
2010-2013, together with questions related to the evolution of perceived competition, of 
demand for their products and to the difficulties in obtaining external financing through 
the usual financial channels. Further, I use a novel empirical approach developed by 
Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) for estimating discrete choice models with binary 
endogenous regressors that allows to control for selection on unobservables. 
The empirical results in this paper reveal that firms subject to financial constraints had 
a significantly higher probability of raising markups than in a counterfactual scenario 
without such constraints, in particular, for those in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, 
the estimated partial effects for the main variables of interest according to the model show 
that over the period 2010-2013 the likelihood of increasing markups was procyclical on 
average, but it was less procyclical when competitive pressures fell during the downturn 
and when the shock to demand was expected to persist. Indeed, if we take the average 
partial effects at face value, the negative effect of an adverse demand shock on the 
likelihood of raising markups would be much higher on average in those cases when the 
fall in demand did not come together with a fall in competition and an increase in 
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persistence. All in all, the empirical results are consistent with those found in the previous 
literature and are mostly in accordance with the predictions from the theoretical 
framework. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this work to the previous literature. 
Section 3 briefly lays out the theoretical framework and explains the empirical strategy. 
Section 4 describes the dataset, while Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 
concludes. 
2 Related literature 
There is a growing literature that assesses both the empirical and theoretical relevance of 
financial constraints for price and markup determination. The idea that firms set prices 
taking into account the trade-off between current and expected future demand and that 
this decision may be affected by imperfections in capital markets was first introduced by 
Gottfries (1991) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). As emphasized in these two 
contributions, firms operating in customer markets may find it optimal to increase their 
prices to boost short run profits and sacrifice future sales, when they face a fall in demand 
accompanied by a liquidity shortage. Some early empirical evidence of this hypothesis was 
provided by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) for the US supermarket industry in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. More recent empirical support was presented by Asplund et al. 
(2005) for the case of the Swedish newspaper industry during the deep recession starting 
in 1990; or by Kimura (2013) for the post-bubble Japanese economy of the 1990s, where 
deflationary forces were attenuated despite large fluctuations in the real economy, in part 
due to the impact of deteriorating financial conditions on firms’ pricing decisions. 
The debate on the role of financial frictions in corporate pricing policies gained 
prominence during the Great Recession, as the extraordinary turmoil that swept through 
financial markets during this period was accompanied by only a mild decrease in inflation 
in most advanced economies. One of the first contributions was Montero and Urtasun 
(2014) for the case of Spain, an economy particularly affected by financial turbulence. 
Using a panel of firm-level data, they find a significant increase in estimated Spanish firms’ 
price-cost markups since 2007. Besides, they show that this finding is related to the high 
degree of financial pressure faced by Spanish firms over the crisis period, on the 
background of an increase in the pace of business destruction which probably resulted in 
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a strengthening of surviving firms’ market power that also tended to increase average 
markups. 
Gilchrist et al. (2017) was also an early and relevant contribution. They use a micro-
level data set containing good-level prices underlying the construction of the US PPI 
merged with the respondent firms’ balance sheets to analyze how differences in firms’ 
internal liquidity positions affect their price-setting behavior during the recent financial 
crisis. They find that liquidity unconstrained firms slashed prices in 2008, whereas those 
with limited internal liquidity significantly increased their prices. Further, they develop a 
general equilibrium model in which monopolistically competitive firms face costly price 
adjustment and costly external finance, while setting prices to actively manage current 
versus future demand. Model simulations show that in response to an adverse financial 
shock, firms with limited internal resources raise prices relative to their financially 
stronger competitors, consistently with the previous empirical evidence. 
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2015) provide additional evidence for the US economy by 
using data at the industry level for a long time span. They find that prices in industries in 
which firms rely more heavily on external finance, thus facing a higher likelihood of 
financing constraints, declined noticeably less in response to economic downturns 
associated with a significant tightening of financial conditions. Moreover, they dig further 
into the implications of the Gilchrist el al. (2017)’s theoretical model by exploring the 
macroeconomic implication of different interest-rate policy rules.   
Antoun de Almeida (2015) and Gilchrist et al. (2016) provide evidence for a systematic 
effect of financial constraints on industry-level producer prices in the euro area.3 In the 
former case, she shows that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
sectoral inflation and firms’ liquidity conditions only for euro area countries under 
distress. A similar result is documented in the latter paper. They find that changes in 
business credit conditions during the crisis are systematically related to the inflation 
residuals from canonical Phillips curve-type relationships only for periphery euro area 
countries.4     
                                                        
3  Balleer et al. (2015) study how financial market imperfections interact with the frequency of price 
adjustment and, using firm-level data, document that financially constrained German firms were more likely 
to increase prices than their unconstrained counterparts over 2002-2014. 
4 They also construct a dynamic multi-country general equilibrium model building on Gilchrist et al. (2017) 
to analyze the business cycle and welfare consequences of forming a monetary union among countries with 
different degrees of financial market distortions. 
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Duca et al. (2017) build on the customer-market model with capital market 
imperfections developed by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) to extend it in two 
directions: they allow for persistence in demand shocks and assume a procyclical 
elasticity of demand. It is shown that these two additional mechanisms magnify the effects 
of financial frictions on the degree of markup countercyclicality (as I will explain below). 
They use firm-level data from the 2014 Wage Dynamics Network Survey for Italian firms 
and find that financially constrained firms had a higher likelihood of increasing their price-
cost markups when faced with a declining demand; and this result is strengthened when 
the shock to demand is perceived to be persistent. These findings suggest that the severity 
of the financial turbulence experienced by Italy in 2010-2013 was one of the causes of the 
sustained rise in prices over this period, despite the significant slack in the economy. 
  
3 Empirical approach 
Theoretical framework 
In order to rationalize the mechanisms underlying firms’ pricing and markup decisions, I 
will use the theoretical model developed by Duca et al. (2017; DMRZ hereafter), which is 
in turn based on Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). In a nutshell, it is a spatial competition 
model with consumer switching costs extended with capital market imperfections à la 
Hart and Moore (1998). As a novelty, DMRZ introduce the increasing-return shopping 
technology of Warner and Barsky (1995) to allow the elasticity of demand to be 
procyclical, which means that firms perceive stronger competition in expansions than 
during recessions. Moreover, they also assume that firms attribute a certain probability to 
the event that the first-period state of demand will persist in the future. The theoretical 
model is fully spelled out in Annex A. 
In that setting, firms operate in a customer-markets framework and have a degree of 
market power over their repeat-purchasers due to the existence of consumer switching 
costs. Thus, firms’ current market shares are valuable, as they determine firms’ future 
profits. In any period, there is a trade-off between investing in market share by setting a 
low price or extracting rents by setting a high price on their locked-in shoppers. In the 
scenario when firms are not subject to financial frictions, markups can be either 
procyclical or countercyclical, depending on the parameters of the model. Markups might 
decrease in recessions when the fall in current demand relative to future demand makes 
it more appealing to invest in market shares by cutting prices and increase monopoly 
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profits in the future, when demand will be relatively high. However, the two additional 
channels would attenuate the fall in markups. When the low state of demand is expected 
to persist in the future, the relative convenience of lowering current markups to reap 
profits in the future, rather than in the present, is weaker. Moreover, when the elasticity 
of demand deceases very much in a slump, the gain in demand from a given price cut is 
diminished, thus reducing the benefits from investing in market shares. Table 1 
summarizes the main predictions from the theoretical model.  
 
On the other hand, when firms are financially constrained, price markups always behave 
in a countercyclical fashion. Intuitively, firms are more likely to be liquidity-constrained 
in recessions, in which case they prefer extracting rents in the short-run by setting a 
higher price, rather than building market shares to enhance future profits. In addition, this 
behavior is strengthened when the firm expects the downturn to persist in the future, as 
the relative appeal of cutting markups to reap profits in the longer-term is diminished. 
And it is further reinforced the more the elasticity of demand falls in slumps, as firms 
become more insulated from competition.  
 
Econometric methodology 
The theoretical model distinguishes between two types of firms: those subject to financial 
frictions/constraints (i.e. being exposed to a “treatment”, fc = 1), and those internally 
financed or not subject to financial constraints (i.e. firms in a “control” group, fc = 0). Table 
1 collects a summary of the main theoretical implications for both types of firms (j = 0, 1) 
in terms of the level of markups (mj), the cyclical response of markups ( ߣ௝ ൌ
߲ ௝݉ ߲݀݁݉ܽ݊݀Τ ), and the sensitivity of this cyclical response with respect to the cyclicality 
of the elasticity of demand (߲ߣ௝ ߲ߥΤ ), and with respect to the persistence of demand shocks 
(߲ߣ௝ ߲ߙΤ ).  
In other words, as it can be seen in Table 1, the level (m), the cyclical response (O) and 
the sensitivity of this cyclical response of a firm’s markup to different economic factors 
(߲ߣ௝ ߲߮Τ ǡ ߮ ൌ ሼߥǡ ߙሽ) depend on the regime/state the firm is facing, which in turn is 
determined by the degree of financial frictions. This setting fits very well with the 
empirical approach developed by Aakvik et al. (2005), who build up a discrete choice 
model that allows for selection in both observables and unobservables, and it also admits 
the responses to vary across states.  
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So let us interpret that “nature” assigns treatment fci to each firm i according to the 
following decision rule: 
fci = 1 if ݂ܿ௜כ ൌ ߛܼ௜ െ ௙ܷ௖ǡ௜ ൒ Ͳ 
      fci = 0 if ݂ܿ௜כ ൌ ߛܼ௜ െ ௙ܷ௖ǡ௜ ൏ Ͳ                                            (1) 
 
where Zi is a vector of observed (by the econometrician) random variables and Ufci is an 
unobserved (by the econometrician) random variable; fc∗i is the net utility that “nature” 
derives from assigning state 1 (i.e. experiencing financial constraints) to firm i. For each 
firm i, I assume two potential outcomes m0i and m1i (whether a firm decides to raise its 
markups or not) corresponding, respectively, to the potential outcomes in the untreated 
and treated states. Then in this model it is assumed that a linear latent index model (with 
unobservables generated by a normal factor) generates the outcomes: 
 ݉ଵ௜ ൌ ܫሺ݉ଵ௜כ ൌ ߚଵݔ௜ െ ଵܷǡ௜ ൒ Ͳሻ 
                                       (2) 
 ݉଴௜ ൌ ܫሺ݉଴௜כ ൌ ߚ଴ݔ௜ െ ܷ଴ǡ௜ ൒ Ͳሻ                              
 
where I(·) is the usual indicator function. It is worth noting that, in accordance with the 
theoretical model, I allow the response of markups to differ across regimes (i.e. β1 ≠ β0). 
Further, m0i and m1i are not observed simultaneously, but instead: 
 
mi = m0i   if fci = 0 
(3) 
mi = m1i   if fci = 1 
I assume that the error terms are driven by the following factor structure: 
 
Ufci = −θi + εfci 
     U1i = −α1θi + ε1i (4) 
   U0i = −α0θi + ε0i 
where θi, εfci, ε0i and ε1i are jointly distributed N(0, I), and where I is the identity matrix 
and I have imposed the normalization that Var(θi) = Var(εj) = 1 for j = fc, 0, 1. These 
assumptions imply that I can identify the correlations between the unobservables related 
to the selection equation and the unobservables for the outcome equations. These 
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correlations convey interesting information regarding the relevance of selection on 
unobservables, and can be computed as: 









Given joint normality, this set of assumptions implies that the joint distribution of the 
vector (Ufc, U0, U1) is known. 5  It is worth noting that in this framework selection on 
unobservables related to the equation for financial constraints are controlled for through 
the component θi. 
The log-likelihood function for this model is: 
ሺܮሻ ൌ ෍ ݈݊ሼȰଶሺߚଵݔ௜ǡ ߛܼ௜ǡ ߩଵሻሽ
௙௖೔ஷ଴ǡ௠೔ஷ଴
൅ ෍ ݈݊ሼȰଶሺെߚଵݔ௜ǡ ߛܼ௜ǡ െߩଵሻሽ
௙௖೔ஷ଴ǡ௠೔ୀ଴
൅ ෍ ݈݊ሼȰଶሺߚ଴ݔ௜ǡ െߛܼ௜ǡ െߩ଴ሻሽ ൅ ෍ ݈݊ሼȰଶሺെߚ଴ݔ௜ǡ െߛܼ௜ǡ ߩ଴ሻሽ
௙௖೔ୀ଴ǡ௠೔ୀ଴௙௖೔ୀ଴ǡ௠೔ஷ଴
 
where Φ2(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a bivariate normal distribution.6 
An important advantage of this latent variable model is that it can be used to estimate 
mean treatment parameters from a common set of structural parameters, as 
demonstrated by Aakvik et al. (2005). Let’s define the treatment effect for a given firm i as 
Di = m1i − m0i, which is a counterfactual (both outcomes cannot be observed at the same 
time). In this context, I’m mostly interested in the effect of treatment on the treated (TT), 
which would give the average effect on the probability of raising markups for a firm 
subject to “treatment” (i.e. financial constraints). For firms with observed characteristics 
x it is defined as: 
ܶܶሺݔ௜ሻ ؠ ܧሺܦ௜ ܺ ൌ ݔ௜ǡ ݂ܿ௜ ൌ ͳΤ ሻ ൌ ሺ݉ଵ௜ ൌ ͳ ܺ ൌ ݔ௜ǡ ݂ܿ௜ ൌ ͳΤ ሻ െ ሺ݉଴௜ ൌ ͳ ܺ ൌ ݔ௜ǡ ݂ܿ௜ ൌ ͳΤ ሻ
ൌ ߔʹ൫ߚͳݔ݅ǡ ߛܼ݅ǡ ߩͳ൯ െ ߔʹ൫ߚͲݔ݅ǡ ߛܼ݅ǡ ߩͲ൯ߔܷ݂ܿሺߛܼ݅ሻ  
                                                                                        (5) 
                                                        
5 To fully characterize the distribution, it is also needed the correlation  ሺଵǡ ଴ሻ ൌ ɏ଴ଵ ൌ ஑బ஑భටଵା஑బమටଵା஑భమ
 . 
6  The vector Zi may collect a set of instrumental variables, which are not strictly necessary, but help in 
identifying the model, as argued by Aakvik et al. (2005). 
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One can also be interested in computing some averages of the distribution of TT(x) over 
the support of X, such as the average treatment effects (ATT) for the corresponding 
subgroups of the population. This can be easily calculated by averaging the expression for 
TT(x) over the observations in the subgroups. For instance, the ATT for the whole 
subsample of “treated” (i.e. financially constrained) firms (Nfc) can be calculated as: 
 ܣܶܶ ൌ ଵே೑೎ σ ܶܶሺݔ௜ሻ
ே೑೎
௜ୀଵ  (6) 
A similar expression can be used to calculate the ATT for firms in a given country or with 
any other characteristic, as it will be shown below. 
In short, this is a binary choice model with binary endogenous regressors which is a 
bit more sophisticated than the bivariate probit or the probit model with sample selection, 
as both biprobit and heckprobit assume equality of coefficients in the outcome equations 
for both treatment regimes.7 
 
4 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on a unique cross-country dataset on European firms’ 
employment adjustment strategies, as well as price- and wage-setting behavior, collected 
through and ad-hoc survey by the European System of Central Banks in 2014 in the 
context of the third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). The questionnaire 
consists almost exclusively of qualitative questions and includes three types of queries: (i) 
core harmonized questions, uniformly administered throughout the different countries to 
allow for international comparison; (ii) non-core questions (also harmonized across 
countries, but optional); and (iii) local questions, administered only at the country level.8 
The estimation sample is determined by the availability of the non-core question 
(NC2.7b) on the evolution of prices vis-á-vis total costs over 2010-2013. Only 7 (out of 25) 
countries responded to this question on price-cost margins, namely, the Czech Republic, 
Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Spain. Moreover, I cleaned observations from 
regulated and non-market sectors, where pricing decisions are not very much driven by 
market forces —such as electricity, gas and water, financial intermediation, public sector 
                                                        
7 I use the Stata’s command switch_probit developed by Lokshin and Sajaia (2011) to estimate this model. 
8 See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/research-networks/html/researcher_wdn.en.html for 
more details about the database. 
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services and arts—.9 Firms with less than 5 employees were also dropped, as they were 
all concentrated on Poland and Luxembourg. The distribution of firms across 
countries/size strata and industries is given in Table 2. 
The dependent variable for the outcome equations (2) in the estimation exercises is a 
dummy variable coded as unity if the firm raised markups, and zero otherwise. To be more 
specific, it equals one when firms replied that prices (as compared to total costs) increased 
either moderately or strongly during 2010–2013.10 
Secondly, I include information on the main variables of interest according to the 
theoretical model described in Section 3. These variables are the dynamics of demand, the 
evolution of perceived competition –as an approximation for the evolution of the elasticity 
of demand–, the persistence of demand shocks, and the extent of financial constraints. I 
account for the dynamics of demand (i.e. the proxy for the cycle or the state of demand) 
by introducing a dummy which is equal to one if the firm reported a negative evolution 
(strong/moderate decrease) of the domestic or foreign demand for its main 
product/service during 2010-2013. Regarding the degree of perceived competition, I 
define a dummy which equals one when firms report a (strong/moderate) decrease in 
competitive pressure on its main product/service (either on domestic or foreign markets), 
compared to the situation before 2008. Additionally, I will proxy for the level of demand 
persistence through firms’ perception about volatility/uncertainty of their demand. A 
higher volatility is interpreted as meaning that shocks are expected to be less persistent, 
as the likelihood that there will be a future reversal of demand is higher. Thus, the dummy 
for the volatility of demand for the firm’s main product is coded as one when the firm 
reports that volatility has not had a negative effect on its activity during 2010-2013, 
because high volatility is likely to be perceived as a negative factor.11 
                                                        
9 As argued in DMRZ, the theoretical model is based on the presumption that consumers develop switching 
costs after their initial purchases, which provides firms with a certain degree of market power over their 
customer base. Thus, in the empirical exercise it would be desirable to restrict the sample to firms in 
industries which are more prone to develop this type of “brand loyalty”. A priori, as argued by Motta (2004, 
pp 79-81) and Klemperer (1995), one can realistically think that the existence of switching costs is a 
widespread phenomenon across many industries. For this reason, I prefer to do a minimal cleaning and only 
drop firms belonging to regulated and non-market sectors. Additionally, Gilchrist et al. (2017) provide 
several references in support of the fact that customer markets are an important feature of the major sectors 
in the US economy. 
10 The remaining categories are strong decrease, moderate decrease or unchanged. 
11 In the experience of the WDN, firms tend to reply to the question about how the volatility of demand 
affected their activity having in mind that high volatility is a negative factor. Moreover, in the WDN survey 
about two thirds of firms reporting that volatility/uncertainty had a strong negative effect on their activity 
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Additionally, and more importantly, I consider variables accounting for credit 
availability in order to define the dependent variable for the selection equation (1). In 
particular, the survey asked firms to relate the difficulties in obtaining credit to the main 
purpose for which finance was needed. Namely, they were asked to assign a ranking (“not 
relevant”, “of little relevance”, “relevant”, “very relevant”) to the events “Credit was not 
available” and “Credit was available but conditions were too onerous” for financing the 
following activities: (i) working capital, (ii) new investment, and (iii) refinance existing 
debt (rollover). Firms were defined as financially constrained (dummy fc equal to one) if 
they replied “relevant” or “very relevant” to any of the six questions.12 
Finally, I also account for several firm-level characteristics (all of them 0/1 dummies) 
which are potentially relevant for the price-markup decision and as determinants of 
financial constraints. These variables are the country of origin, sectoral dummies 
(industry, trade and business services), firm size (three dummies: for less than 50, 
between 50 and 199 and at least 200 employees), nationality of the ownership (mainly 
domestic or mainly foreign), degree of autonomy (namely, whether the firm is a 
subsidiary/affiliate or not) and organizational structure (single- or multi-establishment 
firm). 
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
for treatment vs non-treatment status. There exist clear differences in the observable 
characteristics between treated and non-treated firms that, besides, are mostly 
statistically significant. The treated units are more likely to be small and medium-sized (5 
pp on average), younger (one year on average), and more likely to operate in the 
manufacturing-construction sector. 13  Moreover, the share of firms that are foreign-
owned, a subsidiary or part of a multi-establishment firm is lower among financially-
constrained firms. Furthermore, these firms are more likely to report a fall in demand and 
a fall in the degree of competition, while they are less probable to have a lower volatility. 
Finally, although there is a slightly higher (unconditional) likelihood of raising their price-
cost margins (more on this below) for non-financially constrained businesses (27% vs 
26%), it is not statistically significant. 
                                                        
considered this effect transitory or at worst partly persistent (see Annex B for the wording of the question). 
This would support the view that negative shocks that are volatile are more likely to be less persistent. 
12 I also tried with a less stringent definition whereby a firm is considered as financially-constrained when 
it replies “relevant” or “very relevant” to at least one of the questions in the block “Credit was not available” 
and at least one in the part “Credit was available but conditions were too onerous”. Results were very 
similar.  
13 In this case, the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
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5 Results 
Let me start with a brief discussion of the estimated coefficient values from the selection 
and the outcome equations. Then, I report estimates of the mean treatment parameters 
(for the population of WDN firms) derived from those estimated coefficients, as well as 
the partial effects for the main regressors of interest. As noted above, under the normality 
and factor structure assumptions no exclusion restrictions are required to identify the 
mean treatment effects. However, as recommended by Aakvik et al. (2005), I use a 
(plausible) exclusion restriction to enhance identification: firm’s age, which besides being 
an important determinant of the probability of being subject to financial constraints, 14 it 
complies with the fundamental requirement that is available for all the 7 countries. I thus 
follow DMRZ who also use firms’ age as an instrument in a similar context. The literature 
has shown that a firm’s age is a particularly useful predictor of financial constraint levels.15 
Moreover, an appealing feature of this variable is that it is much less endogenous than 
most other usual proxies for financial constraints, such as a firm’s leverage and cash flow. 
In short, it is reasonable to expect a firm’s age to influence its probability of being 
financially constrained, but not to affect the markup decision directly —only through its 
impact on financial constraints—. Indeed, estimation results reported in Table 8 below 
support the choice of age as a reasonable instrumental variable. 
Estimated coefficients and mean treatment parameters 
Table 4 reports estimation results for the selection equation and the two outcome 
equations. Starting with the selection equation, consistent with figures in Table 3, there is 
a clear evidence that there is non-random selection into “treatment”, i.e. firms subject to 
financial constraints differ significantly from those not subject to such constraints with 
respect to observable characteristics. For instance, those characteristics attached to a 
lower probability of suffering financial problems are: experiencing a fall in volatility, or 
being a subsidiary or a foreign-owned company. The coefficient on our instrumental 
variable (age) has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant. 
                                                        
14 The rationale is that information asymmetries are likely to be especially large for newly-established firms, 
because creditors have not had enough time to monitor such firms and because such firms have not had 
enough time to build long-term relationships with suppliers of finance (see inter alia Coluzzi et al., 2015, 
and references therein). 
15 Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that financial constraints fall sharply as young (and small) firms start to 
mature and grow. Eventually, these relations appear to level off. 
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Regarding regression results for the outcome equations (columns 2 and 3), those firms 
suffering a negative demand shock have lower chances of raising markups over the period 
2010-2013, with a similar coefficient in both states. This effect is dampened if the demand 
shock comes together with a fall in competition. Other statistically significant coefficients 
are those for a fall in competition (with a negative sign), being a subsidiary (with opposite 
sign across states) and being a foreign-owned firm for fc = 0.  
Another important piece of information comes from the correlation among 
unobserved components. The estimated correlation ρ0 suggests that the unobservables 
that promote financial constraints are highly negatively correlated with the 
unobservables that promote higher markups in the no-financial-constraints state. 
However, those unobservables are highly positively correlated with the unobservables 
that promote higher markups in the financially constrained state (positive ρ1). Thus, firms 
which are more likely to suffer financial constraints (i.e. with low values of Ufc) are more 
likely to have higher treatment effects; hence, selection is positive for the outcome. Finally, 
the LR test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no selection bias due to unobservables 
(i.e. H0: error terms are independent across equations) at conventional levels. 
Additionally, one interesting issue that can be studied with this empirical framework 
is whether firms experiencing a financial shock have a larger likelihood of raising markups 
than firms non-financially constrained. In order to do this, one can use expressions (5)–
(6) above for computing the different mean treatment parameters associated with the 
estimated parameters just reported. I find (see the final rows of Table 4) that the ATT = 
E(D|fc = 1) = 0.237, which suggests that a firm subject to financial constraints had a 23.7 
pp higher probability of raising markups compared with the counterfactual scenario of 
firms operating without financial constraints.16 Using the vocabulary from the program 
evaluation literature, these results suggest that selection into treatment (suffering a 
financial shock) was highly positive for the outcome (increasing markups), which is 
consistent with the estimated correlation coefficients described in the previous 
paragraph. In comparison, as reported in Table 3, the raw difference in mean outcomes is 
−0.011 (i.e. E(m1|fc = 1)−E(m0|fc = 0) = −0.011). Thus, controlling for selection (both on 
observables and on unobservables) appears to have a substantial impact on the point 
estimates for mean treatment effects. 
                                                        
16 Bootstrapped standard errors for ATT are very large, which might be suggesting that much larger sample sizes 
are needed to accurately estimate this type of model. 
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It is also interesting to study the degree of heterogeneity in the distribution of 
treatment effects by a firm’s country of origin. Table 5 reports some descriptive statistics 
for the distribution of TT by country. It reveals that the ATT is larger for firms from Eastern 
European countries (CZ, PL, LV). The ATT is lower for Italian firms, while that for Spanish 
firms would be in a middle position. Figure 1 displays the kernel densities of these 
treatment effects grouping together firms for each one of the three largest economies (ES, 
IT and PL) and for the rest. It is worth noting that the estimated treatment effects are 
always positive, and that the distribution for Spanish firms is shifted to the right of the 
distribution for Italian firms, while that for Polish corporations is further shifted to the 
right. Thus, these results suggest that firms subject to financial constraints in Spain or in 
Poland had a higher probability of raising markups than in Italy, as compared to a 
counterfactual scenario without financial constraints. 
 
Estimated partial effects of main variables 
I can go a step further and compute the partial effects of the main variables on the 
probability of increasing price-cost margins in both states (fc = 0 and fc = 1) and check 
whether these effects are consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model. To 
be more specific, and for simplicity, assume that the empirical model can be written as: 
 
E(m|x1, x2, z, fc) = F(β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 + δz) 
where I have omitted subscripts and m = 1 if the firm raises markups (0 otherwise); x1 
stands for the variable “fall in demand” and x2 = {“fall in competition”, “fall in volatility”}. In 
order to test the predictions of the theoretical model, I want to estimate, first, the partial 
effects associated with the cyclical variable (fall in demand, i.e. x1). In other words, the 
following expression provides how much the probability of increasing markups changes 
when the state of demand goes from a boom to a downturn: 
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And second, according to the theoretical framework, this partial effect changes when 
the degree of either competition or persistence changes. Therefore, one would like to 
calculate the following cross “derivative”:17 
 
 
Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010) show that this expression is as follows: 
∆(x1, x2) = [F(β1 + β2 + β12 + δz) − F(β2 + δz)] − [F(β1 + δz) − F(δz)] 
 
Then asymptotic standard errors for the partial and interaction effects can be calculated 
using the delta method. It is worth noting that with this approach I can compute a partial 
effect and its associated standard error for each observation, i.e. it is obtained a 
distribution of partial effects for the whole sample of firms (Greene, 2010). Consequently, 
since it is difficult to create a single number that summarizes all the partial effects, in Table 
6 I report the estimated average partial effects (APE) across all observations, as well as 
the max/min effects and the max/min Wald statistics for the test of significance of 
individual partial effects. Further, I also report the share of partial effects that are 
statistically significant (below each APE) to give a flavor of overall statistical significance. 
As shown in Table 6, the likelihood of increasing markups is procyclial on average, in 
the sense that the partial effect for “fall in demand” is negative. And this is the case for both 
financially and non-financially constrained firms, which in the former instance would be 
inconsistent with the theoretical model. The APE is around −0.18 in both cases, a large 
magnitude: changing from an increase to a decrease in demand lowers the probability of 
increasing markups by 18 percentage points. Moreover, the range of estimated partial 
effects and the degree of statistical significance is somewhat similar across both types of 
firms. Figure 2 displays the distribution of partial effects by country, with special focus on 
Spain. It is interesting to note that while all the partial effects are negative, those for 
Spanish firms are relatively shifted to the right. In other words, the likelihood of higher 
markups is less procyclical in this country. Further, the partial effects for “fall in demand” 
are less negative (i.e. the probability of raising markups is less procyclical) when 
competitive pressures fall during the downturn on average, which is consistent with the 
                                                        
17 Strictly speaking we cannot speak about derivatives, but rather about discrete differences, as we are dealing 
with binary variables. 
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model’s predictions. However, I find a lower degree of statistical significance (with an 
average around 30%) for these partial effects than for the previous ones (average around 
90%). Finally, that partial effect would also be less negative (markups would be less 
procyclical) in both states the more the shock to demand is expected to persist (i.e. when 
volatility falls), although the estimated interaction effects are not statistically significant 
across the whole distribution of firms. All in all, if one takes the three APE at face value, 
the negative effect of an adverse demand shock on the likelihood of increasing markups 
would be much higher on average in those cases when the fall in demand does not go hand 
in hand with a combined fall in competition and increase in the persistence of the shock.  
Robustness 
Table 7 reports the estimated partial effects and mean treatment parameters for a set of 
alternative specifications. In the first two set of estimates (Panel A) I introduce an 
additional dimension of heterogeneity by considering separately the baseline scenario for 
firms in the manufacturing sector and in the services sector. 18 Although the overall 
message is similar, it is worth remarking the higher degree of statistical significance in the 
results for manufacturing firms, which would suggest that the customer-market model 
with financial constraints fits better this type of firms. Moreover, the ATT is large and 
statistically significant, while the interaction of a fall in demand and in volatility has a 
positive and significant effect for (almost) all manufacturing firms. Indeed, in this case, a 
combined scenario of a negative shock in demand with a fall in the degree of competition 
and an increase in the degree of persistence would deliver a substantially smaller 
procyclical likelihood of raising markups, consistently with our theoretical model. Results 
for firms in the services sector are in line with the baseline, although with a lower degree 
of statistical significance. Figure 3 shows the distribution of treatment effects by country. 
The kernel densities are very similar to those in Figure 1, with the distribution for Spanish 
firms in between the distribution for Italian and Polish firms. The distribution for 
manufacturing firms seems to be somewhat more spread than for services firms. 
Removing sampling weights (Panel B, first columns) from the estimation does not alter 
our results, while replacing sampling with employment weights (Panel B, latter columns) 
yields similar results as well. In both cases, we find a lower degree of statistical 
                                                        
18 There are some fundamental differences between manufacturing and services firms that would justify 
considering them separately, such as the tangibility of their products, the possibility of holding inventories, 
or the requirement of a physical production site. 
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significance in the partial effects for the interaction between a fall in demand and a fall in 
competition. And lastly, as there is not much evidence about financial frictions and pricing 
behavior by firm size, in Panel C I report estimation results when heterogeneity by firm 
size is considered. The model is estimated for firms split into two groups: small-sized 
(those with up to 50 employees) and medium- and large-sized firms (over 50 employees). 
As I have argued above, smaller firms are more financially fragile, so one would expect 
them to be more responsive when faced with a financial shock. However, I find that 
estimated partial effects are quite similar across both types of firms (and with respect to 
the baseline specification). Regarding the ATT, it is also similar, even slightly bigger for 
larger firms.  
In Table 8 I compare the baseline estimated treatment parameters and partial effects 
with the estimates produced from some alternative linear estimators to assess whether 
the results are mainly driven by the highly nonlinear approach I follow. In particular, I use 
the linear IV approach suggested by Angrist (2001) or Angrist and Pischke (2009). Thus, 
I first impose a linear probability model for the outcome equation assuming that treatment 
(i.e. fc = 0, 1) only shifts its intercept, and use the variable age as instrumental variable in 
a 2SLS regression. This approach has the additional benefit that it allows to check the 
strength of the instrumental variable used. Results in the first column of Table 8 indeed 
show that the estimates based on linear 2SLS are very close to those from the Aakvik et al. 
(2005) approach, which is reassuring. The ATT is 0.207, close to the baseline 0.237, while 
the coefficients for the main variables of interest have the same sign than in the baseline 
specification.  The APE for a fall in demand is -0.148, again near −0.18 in the baseline.19 
Moreover, I also report at the bottom of the first column some statistics to assess the 
quality of the instrumental variable. Firm’s age is highly significant in the first stage 
regression, and even though the F statistic is slightly below 10, the Wald statistic for the 
Cragg-Donald test of weak instruments would pass the test for a 15% rejection rate (test 
size). Thus, firm’s age seems to be a reasonably good instrumental variable. Finally, when 
I split the sample in two (between firms with fc = 0 and those with fc = 1) and estimate a 
simple linear probability model by OLS, I also obtain similar results in terms of the signs 
of the coefficients for the main variables of interest.  
 
                                                        
19 The APE is computed evaluating the expression -0.284 + 0.294·fall_in_competi + 0.183·fall_in_volati at the 
mean of the variables considered.   
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6 Conclusions 
In this paper I have used the third wave of the WDN survey to investigate the role of 
financial frictions in firms’ price-setting behavior in some European economies over the 
crisis period between 2010 and 2013. 
In order to rationalize the empirical results, I start from the customer-market model 
with financial frictions developed in Duca et al. (2017). In this setting, price markups 
behave in a countercyclical fashion if firms are financially constrained, as they are more 
likely to be liquidity-constrained in recessions and, thus, place a greater weight on short-
run profits than on future profits. This behavior is further strengthened when the state of 
demand is perceived to be highly persistent and the more the competitive pressures fall 
during busts, as it diminishes the convenience of lowering current markups to reap future 
profits. 
I take this model to the data using a subsample of European firms participating in the 
2014 version of the WDN survey. Moreover, given the characteristics of the database, 
which consists mostly of qualitative variables, I use a novel empirical approach developed 
in the context of the treatment effects literature by Aakvik et al. (2005) for estimating 
discrete choice models with binary endogenous regressors and unobservables generated 
by factor structures. I find that firms subject to financial constraints had a significantly 
higher probability of raising markups than in a counterfactual scenario without such 
constraints. This treatment effect is statistically significant for manufacturing firms. 
Moreover, the estimated partial effects for the main variables of interest in the model 
show that the likelihood of increasing markups decreases when demand falls, but less so 
when competitive pressures fall during downturns and when the shock to demand is 
expected to persist. If one takes the average partial effects at face value, the negative effect 
of an adverse demand shock on the likelihood of raising markups would be much higher 
on average in those cases when the fall in demand does not come together with a 
combined fall in competition and an increase in persistence. All in all, the empirical results 
are mostly in accordance with the predictions from the theoretical framework, the main 
exception being the finding that the probability of increasing price margins seems to be 
procyclical for financially-constrained firms. 
In sum, these findings suggest that the extreme degree of financial turbulence 
experienced by the European economy over the period 2010-2013 could be a relevant 
factor behind the dampened evolution of inflation in many countries. This would also be 
consistent with the available results obtained recently for Japan, the US, Spain or Italy. 
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Thus, the evidence presented in this paper supports the view that any attempt to 
understand price-cost margins in the aggregate must account for firms’ differential access 
to capital markets over time. The interaction between a firm’s balance sheet position and 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Main predictions from DMRZ’s model 
Internally financed firms (fci = 0) Externally financed firms (fci = 1) 
݉௢ ൌ ݂ሺ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ǡ ߥǡ ߙሻ ݉ଵ ൌ ݃ሺ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ǡ ߥǡ ߙሻ 
ߣ଴ ؠ
߲݉௢
߲݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ س Ͳ ߣଵ ؠ
߲݉ଵ
߲݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ ൏ Ͳ 
߲ߣ଴
߲ߥ ൏ Ͳ 
߲ߣଵ
߲ߥ ൏ Ͳ 
߲ߣ଴
߲ߙ ൏ Ͳ 
߲ߣଵ
߲ߙ ൏ Ͳ 
Notes: mj represents the level of markups for type j firm (j = 0, 1). The cyclical response of markups is given by ߣ௝ ؠ




Table 2: Sectoral breakdown  
Country name Manufacturing Construction Trade Business services 
CZ 498 85 156 272 
ES 506 0 600 851 
IT 553 15 229 290 
LU 54 129 113 165 
LV 100 69 173 203 
MT 32 9 26 72 
PL 415 124 300 305 
Size (#workers)     
5-19 519 146 855 1,047 
20-49 608 139 431 492 
50-199 573 100 220 381 
200+ 457 46 91 235 
Notes: The definition of the sectors is based on NACE Rev.2. The business service category includes firms from 
transportation and storage; accommodation and food service activities; information and communication; real 
estate activities; professional, scientific and technical activities; and administrative and support service 
activities. Trade includes units from retail and wholesale trade. 
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Increase in markups = 1 0.260 
(0.439) 
0.271 
(0.445)    
0.304 













































Notes: Treated (non-treated) firms are those for which fc=1 (fc=0). The manufacturing sector also includes 
construction firms. See the text for the definition of the different variables. The third column reports the p-value 
for a test of equality of means across both groups of firms.  
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 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) 
Fall in demand = 1 −0.086 −0.738 −0.713 
 (0.203) (0.260)∗∗∗ (0.324)∗∗ 
Fall in competition = 1 −0.110 −0.408 −0.804 
 (0.500) (0.182)∗∗ (0.326)∗∗∗ 
Fall in volatility = 1 −0.603 −0.119 −0.211 
 (0.183)∗∗∗ (0.248) (0.274) 
Fall in (demand & compet.) 0.294 0.256 1.142 
 (0.566) (0.269) (0.489)∗∗ 
Fall in (demand & volat.) 0.376 0.291 0.593 
 (0.253) (0.325) (0.381) 
Ownership (Foreign = 1) −0.565 0.608 −0.202 
 (0.164)∗∗∗ (0.160)∗∗∗ (0.263) 
Subsidiary = 1 −0.456 0.386 −0.579 
 (0.165)∗∗∗ (0.139)∗∗∗ (0.201)∗∗∗ 
Structure (Multi-establ. = 1) 0.073 0.026 0.203 
   (0.109) (0.191) (0.208) 
Age −0.166 
(0.046)∗∗∗ - - 




LR test independent errors 





Obs. 5147  
Industry, size and country dummies included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sampling 
weights. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Bootstrapped (200 
replications) standard errors for ATT. 
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Table 5: Treatment effects on the treated by country 
Country 
# treated 
firms ATT Std. Dev. Min Max 
CZ 237 0.265 0.152 0.034 0.673 
ES 979 0.177 0.089 0.013 0.763 
IT 459 0.099 0.080 0.008 0.530 
LU 164 0.299 0.161 0.032 0.747 
LV 38 0.524 0.167 0.117 0.922 
MT 14 0.177 0.089 0.027 0.326 
PL 614 0.391 0.135 0.051 0.875 
 














Spain vs Other countries
Distribution of treatment effects by country
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Table 6: Average partial effects (APE) of main regressors on P(m = 1|fc, X) 
Panel A. P(m = 1|fc = 0, X)  
  APE Min. Max. Min. Wald test Max. Wald test 
(%stat.sig.) effect effect stat. (p-value) stat. (p-value) 
Fall in demand = 1     -0.183 
(92.1%) -0.667 -0.011 0.000 0.493 
Fall in (demand 
& compet.) 
0.116 
(25.1%) -0.130 0.333 0.005 0.960 
Fall in (demand 
& volatility) 
0.093 
(0.0%) 0.016 0.212 0.343 0.510 
 
Panel B. P(m = 1|fc = 1, X) 
 
APE Min. Max. Min. Wald test Max. Wald test 
(%stat.sig.) effect effect stat. (p-value) stat. (p-value) 
Fall in demand = 1 -0.179 
(88.7%) -0.480 -0.012 0.000 0.499 
Fall in (demand 
& compet.) 
0.126 
(34.6%) 0.025 0.321 0.000 0.603 
Fall in (demand 
& volatility) 
0.095 
(0.0%) 0.007 0.222 0.343 0.439 
APE: averaged across all relevant observations. In parentheses we report the share of APE that are statistically significant at 
a 10% level. Min/Max effects and Min/Max Wald tests based on values computed for each observation. Standard errors 
estimated by the Delta method. 
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Table 7: Average Partial Effects for alternative specifications 
 Panel A. Manufacturing vs Market Services 
  Baseline: Manufacturing   Baseline: Mkt. Services  

















Fall in demand = 1 -0.175 -0.791/0.186 -0.145 -0.474/0.140 -0.187 -0.600/-0.045 -0.183 -0.662/-0.012 
 (32.4%)  (38.1%)  (62.4%)  (58.2%)  
Fall in (dem. & compet.) 0.197 0.024/0.454 0.164 0.000/0.251 0.108 -0.164/0.331 0.110 0.027/0.404 
 (33.5%)  (41.5%)  (0.8%)  (3.4%)  
Fall in (dem. & volat.) 0.256 0.022/0.665 0.211 0.000/0.382 0.041 -0.003/0.103 0.042 -0.003/0.156 
 (99.9%)  (100%)  (0%)  (0%)  
ATT 0.244 0.239 
 (0.148)* (0.289) 
No. observations 2096 3051 
Panel B. Sampling weights 
No sampling weights Employment weights 

















Fall in demand = 1 -0.158 -0.426/-0.046 -0.132 -0.221/-0.040 -0.162 -0.366/-0.013 -0.186 -0.394/-0.016 
 (96.3%)  (95.4%)  (82.6%)  (88.2%)  
Fall in (dem. & compet.) 0.068 0.035/0.149 0.057 0.024/0.077 0.124 0.043/0.170 0.141 0.044/0.184 
 (0%)  (0%)  (0%)  (0%)  
Fall in (dem. & volat.) 0.033 0.009/0.102 0.037 0.010/0.070 0.053 -0.004/0.200 0.063 -0.014/0.214 
 (0%)  (1.0%)  (0%)  (0%)  
ATT 0.239 0.196 
 (0.235) (0.358) 
No. observations 5147 5147 
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Table 7: Continued. 
 
 Panel C. Small vs Medium&Large firms 
  Baseline: Small firms  Baseline: Medium&Large firms 

















Fall in demand = 1 -0.178 -0.643/-0.009 -0.169 -0.507/-0.013 -0.169 -0.342/-0.041 -0.229 -0.381/-0.072 
 (77.6%)  (80.6%)  (96.1%)  (95.1%)  
Fall in (demand & compet.) 0.115 -0.106/0.338 0.115 0.021/0.329 0.097 0.050/0.139 0.121 0.066/0.156 
 (23.4%)  (33.5%)  (0%)  (0%)  
Fall in (demand & volat.) 0.097 0.014/0.225 0.096 0.008/0.242 0.013 -0.025/0.147 0.052 -0.077/0.21 
 (0%)  (0%)  (0%)  (2.2%)  
ATT 0.248 0.260 
 (0.215) (0.278) 
No. observations 3465 1682 
APE: averaged across all relevant observations. In parentheses we report the share of APE that are statistically significant at a 10% level. Min/Max effects based on 
values computed for each observation. Standard errors estimated by the Delta method, except for the ATT (which are boostrapped, 200 replications). 
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Table 8: Results for alternative estimators: linear models 
 2SLS OLS OLS 
  fc = 0 fc = 1 
fc (= ATT) 0.207 
(0.342) 
  
Fall in demand = 1 -0.284 -0.341 -0.243 
 (0.092)*** (0.096)*** (0.119)** 
Fall in (demand & compet.) 0.294 0.096 0.449 
 (0.128)** (0.069) (0.176)*** 
Fall in (demand & volat.) 0.183 0.237 0.125 
 (0.115) (0.111)** (0.149) 
R2 0.107 0.135 0.126 
Age (First stage) -0.065 
(0.022)*** 
  
First-stage F-stat. 8.80   
Cragg-Donald Wald stat. 10.49   
No. observations 5147 2694 2466 
Notes: All the regressions include the same RHS variables than in Table 4. They are omitted for the sake of simplicity. The 
first-stage F statistic is computed for the excluded instrument (Age). The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic must be compared with 
Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values. For a rejection rate of at most 10% and 15% these critical values are 16.38 and 8.96, 
respectively. 
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Annex A: Theoretical model 
In this annex I provide a detailed description of the model developed in Duca, Montero, 
Riggi and Zizza (2017, DMRZ hereafter), which is in turn based on Chevalier and 
Scharfstein (1996, CS hereafter). It is a spatial competition model with consumer 
switching costs extended with capital market imperfections. 
 
A.1 The model 
There are two firms k = A, B, who compete for two periods τ = 1,2. There is a mass of 
consumers, normalized to 1, who reside uniformly on the line segment [0,1], with firm A 
located at 0 and firm B located at 1. Each shopper has a reservation price R for one unit of 
a good produced by A or B. Only one type of good is bought and sold. In the first period 
consumers bear a transportation cost of t per unit of distance traveled20 along the line to 
the firm of their choice. These costs are zero in the second period, but consumers develop 
switching costs, s, because of their first-period purchases. 
As a first novelty, DMRZ follow Warner and Barsky (1995) and assume that each 
consumer purchases θH or θL < θH units of the good per period instead of one unit, as in CS. 
This way the shopping volume per consumer increases (decreases) in booms (recessions), 
which delivers a procyclical elasticity of demand. This means that firms perceive stronger 
competition in expansions than during downturns. The idea of a procyclical elasticity of 
demand dates back to Robinson (1933) and it was taken up more recently by Bils (1989), 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) and Warner and Barsky (1995).21  
Both firms produce with a constant marginal cost c and set first-period prices before 
they know the demand realization. For each firm, first-period demand can be high (θ1 = 
                                                        
20 Alternatively, it can be interpreted as measuring how far each firm’s product is from a consumer’s 
ideal set of product characteristics. 
21 Bils (1989) uses a customer-market model in which the inflow of new customers more responsive to 
prices generates a higher demand elasticity in booming periods. He provides indirect evidence on the 
cyclical importance of new, more price-elastic consumers, at an aggregate level and for retailers of electrical 
appliances. Warner and Barsky (1995), in turn, propose a different mechanism: retailers perceive their 
demand to be more elastic in the high demand states, because in such periods consumers are more vigilant 
and better informed. This would explain a well-known micro puzzle: the tendency for markdowns to occur 
when shopping intensity is exogenously high, like in weekends or prior to Christmas, as it allows sharing 
fixed costs of shopping across purchases. On the empirical side, Field and Pagoulatos (1997) provide 
empirical evidence of a procyclical price elasticity of demand for a panel of 38 US food manufacturing 
industries from 1972 to 1987; whereas Riggi and Santoro (2015) find that the elasticity of demand 
increased after 1999 in Italy in the wake of a demand stimulus. 
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θH) with probability μ, or low (θ1 = θL) with probability (1 − μ). As a second novelty, DMRZ 
assume that firms attribute a certain probability α to the event that the first-period state 
of demand will persist in the future.22 In other words, Pr(θτ = θτ−1)= α. The values of μ and 
α are the same for both firms. 
Finally, to compete in this market firms must invest an amount I at the beginning of the 
first period. 
In order to solve the model, it has to be taken into account that in the second period, 
when consumers’ switching costs have already been built up, a fraction ߪଵ஺  of the 
consumers has bought firm A’s product in τ = 1, while a fraction ߪଵ஻ ൌ ͳ െ ߪଵ஺  has 
previously purchased B’s product. In this context, Klemperer (1995) shows that each firm 
can charge the consumer’s reservation price R in the second period without fear of being 
undercut by its rival, provided that switching costs s are high enough. The intuition is that 
the rival firm would have to cut its price a discrete amount below R–s and, while it may 
sell more units at this lower price, it earns less profits on its own locked-in first-period 
customers.  
Internally financed firms 
The first case considered by DMRZ is when firms are financed with internally generated 
funds. Let’s denote with ݌ఛ௞ the price charged by firm k in period τ. Second-period profits 
for each firm k depend on their first-period market shares: 
  (A1) 
To evaluate the market shares in period 1, one must calculate the location yi∗ (with i = 
H, L) of the shopper who is indifferent between A and B: 
݌ଵ஺ߠ௜ ൅ ݐݕ௜ ൌ ݌ଵ஻ߠ௜ ൅ ݐሺͳ െ ݕ௜ሻ 
or 
  (A2) 
From (A2), one can get that the fraction of consumers that buy from A and B in period 
1 are given by: 
  (A3) 
                                                        
22 CS assume no uncertainty for the second-period demand, which is normalized to one. 
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and first-period profits for firm A can be written as: 
 ߨଵ஺൫݌ͳܣǡ ݌ͳܤǡ ߠͳ൯ ൌ ൫݌ͳܣ െ ܿ൯ߠͳߪͳܣሺߠͳሻ (A4) 
At the beginning of the first period, each firm simultaneously and non-cooperatively 
chooses prices, given its conjecture about its rival price, and before knowing the demand 
realization (i.e. before the customers arrive to the store), to maximize total discounted 
future profits: 
      (A5) 
where it is assumed that the discount factor is 1 and ߠҧଵ  and ߠҧଶ  are firm’s expectations 
formulated at the beginning of time 1 for first- and second-period demand, respectively.23  
Maximizing expression (A5) with respect to the first-period price, it is obtained firm 
A’s pricing reaction curve as a function of firm B’s price: 






ʹఏഥభ  (A6) 
implying that prices are strategic complements (i.e. firm A’s optimal price is increasing in 
its rival’s price). Then, the symmetric equilibrium (݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஻) when both firms are internally 
financed is: 
 ݌ଵכ ൌ ܿ ൅ ݐఏഥభ െ
ఏഥమሺோି௖ሻ
ఏഥభ  (A7) 
and the markup of price over marginal cost (defined as m = p – c) is: 
 ݉ଵכ ൌ ݐఏഥభ െ
ఏഥమሺோି௖ሻ
ఏഥభ  (A8) 
To gain some intuition, it is interesting to discuss the difference between the 
equilibrium markup that emerges in equation (A8) and the one in CS, which is ݉ଵ஼ௌ ൌ ݐ െ
ሺோି௖ሻ
ఏഥభ . First, in their framework, in a one-period setting, each firm would charge a markup 
t, while in the current version of the model, the markup would instead be equal to ݐ ߠഥͳΤ . 
This difference comes from having assumed that consumers wish to buy a different 
number of units depending on being in a period of boom or bust. As a consequence, the 
travel cost they are willing to bear varies with the volume of goods they wish to purchase. 
                                                        
23  They are defined as Ʌതଵ ൌ ɊɅு ൅ ሺͳ െ ɊሻɅ௅  and Ʌതଶ ൌ  ሾɊȽ ൅ ሺͳ െ Ɋሻሺͳ െ ȽሻሿɅு ൅ ሾሺͳ െ ɊሻȽ ൅
Ɋሺͳ െ ȽሻሿɅ௅ .  
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This means that, when firms expect high demand, they perceive greater competition for 
their market area, i.e. a higher elasticity of demand affecting pricing behavior. Note that 








which is clearly procyclical, as it can be shown that ߥ ؠ ߲ߟ ߲ߤ ൌ ሺߠܪ െ ߠܮሻ݌ଵכ ݐΤ ൐ ͲΤ .24 
 
Second, in a two-period setting price margins are lowered by ߠ
ഥʹሺܴെܿሻ
ߠഥͳ  in the DMRZ 
framework and by ሺܴെܿሻߠഥͳ  in CS. This difference comes from having assumed a variable 
second-period demand (ߠҧଶ vs one), whose expected level matters for firms’ incentive to 
compete for first-period market shares, on which they can later charge the monopoly price 
R. 
DMRZ follow CS and think of μ as measuring the level of demand, so that the cyclicality 
of price margins can be measured by ߲݉ଵכ ߲ߤΤ . After some algebra, this derivative is: 
 ߣ ؠ ߲݉ͳכ߲ߤ ൌ
ሺఏಹିఏಽሻሺோି௖ሻ
ఏഥభమ
ቂሺߠு ൅ ߠ௅ሻሺͳ െ ߙሻ െ ௧ሺோି௖ሻቃ (A9) 
 
Thus, markups can be either procyclical (λ > 0) or countercyclical (λ < 0), depending on 
the values of the parameters of the model. 25 Markups might be procyclical, i.e. fall in 
recessions, because the fall in current demand relative to future demand makes it more 
appealing to invest in market shares by cutting prices and increase monopoly profits in 
the future, when demand will be relatively high.  
However, the two additional channels considered would weaken the procyclical 
behavior of markups. As it is evident from equation (A9), ߲ߣ ߲ߙΤ ൏ Ͳ; i.e. the higher the 
expected persistence of demand, the less procyclical (or the more countercyclical) are 
price margins. Intuitively, when the low (high) state of demand is expected to persist in 
                                                        
24 The elasticity of demand in CS is acyclical and given by ݌ଵכ ݐΤ . 
25 This expression is similar to that in CS, except for the term in brackets, which is absent in their model. 
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the future, the relative convenience of lowering current markups to reap profits in the 
future, rather than in the present, is weaker (stronger). 




ఎఏഥభ ൏ Ͳ, which means that the more procyclical 
is the elasticity of demand, the less procyclical (or the more countercyclical) are price 
markups. Intuitively, when the elasticity of demand falls very much in downturns, the gain 
in demand from a given price cut is diminished. Thus, this reduces the benefit from 
investing in market shares by cutting prices during recessions. In other words, in order to 
achieve a given level of present demand and, given switching costs, of future profits, the 
firm has to incur in a larger price decrease, thus harming current profits.      
Financially constrained firms 
In the model with capital-market imperfections, firms need to raise I externally. DMRZ 
follow CS and introduce financial frictions following Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996) 
and Hart and Moore (1998), who build an incomplete-contracts model in which corporate 
cash flows, while being observable to the manager and to investors, cannot be verified by 
outside parties (i.e. a judge). Thus, contracts are incomplete and cannot be contingent on 
firms’ performance. Further, an additional friction is that the manager can costlessly 
divert all project returns to himself, but cannot divert the firms’ productive assets. 
As in Hart and Moore (1998), the allocation of foreclosure rights is crucial for the 
solution of this type of model. The only way to get managers to pay out cash flow is to 
threaten to liquidate the firm’s assets if they do not; however, liquidation is inefficient in 
the sense that assets are transferred away from the entrepreneur who can extract the 
most value from them. This means that firm’s assets are worth a fraction ξ < 1 of the 
remaining cash flow if managed by investors. As Hart and Moore (1998) and Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1996) show, the optimal contract resembles a real-world debt contract, as it 
calls for a fixed payment of D at date 1; if no repayment is made, the investor has the right 
to seize and liquidate the project’s assets. 
Figure1: Model timeline 
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The manager is restrained from diverting cash flow in period 1, and incentivized to pay 
out D, by the prospect of diverting all of the period 2 cash flow to himself. From these 
assumptions, one can derive the incentive compatibility as ܦ ൑ ߨଶ௞ . In the case when the 
project does not generate enough returns (ܦ ൐ ߨଵ௞), then the manager would choose to 
pay nothing and have the assets liquidated. Therefore, the entrepreneur’s total payoff 
would only be ߨଵ௞ . As in CS, and consistently with the conjecture that firms are more likely 
to be liquidity-constrained in recessions, it is assumed that ߨଵ௞ሺߠ௅ሻ ൏ ܦ ൏ ߨଵ௞ሺߠுሻ. See 
Figure 1 for the timing structure of the model. 
Let us define ߨଵ௅௞ ؠ ߨଵ௞ሺߠ௅ሻ as the first-period level of profit when demand is low, while 
ߨଵு௞ ؠ ߨଵ௞ሺߠுሻ  when demand is high. The expected second-period profits, conditional on 
having a high and a low level of demand in the first period, are denoted as π2/1H and π2/1L, 
respectively. Then, the investors’ participation constraint, which ensures that their 
expected payoffs are nonnegative, can be written as: μD + (1 − μ)ξπ2/1L − I ≥ 0. Competition 
among investors ensures that the previous condition is met with equality. The optimal 
contract is designed such that it is consistent with product market equilibrium in periods 
1 and 2. Thus, the value of D in equilibrium, ܦכ ൌ ூିሺଵିఓሻకగమȀభಽఓ , cannot be larger than π2/1H 
for the contract to be both incentive compatible and feasible. It is thus assumed for the 
remainder that D∗ ≤ π2/1H. 
In this setting, firm A chooses ݌ଵ஺ to maximize the expected payoff over the two periods, 
defined as: ܸ஺ ൌ ߤൣߨଵ௅௞ െ ܦ ൅ ߨଶȀଵு௞ ൧ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߤሻߨଵ௅஺ , taking D and ݌ଵ஻  as given. The first-
order condition results from equalizing (A10) to zero: 
  (A10) 
Let us denote ߠҧଶȀଵு ؠ ߙߠு ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻߠ௅ the expected demand in the second period 
conditional on having a high demand level in the first one. From condition (A10), the 
symmetric equilibrium when both firms are externally financed implies that: 
 ݌ଵכ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߠ
ഥͳ
୻ ݐ െ ߤ
ߠഥʹȀͳܪߠܪ
୻ ሺܴ െ ܿሻ (A11) 
and the equilibrium markup is: 
                                                             ݉ଵכ ൌ ߠ
ഥͳ
୻ ݐ െ ߤ
ߠഥʹȀͳܪߠܪ
୻ ሺܴ െ ܿሻ                                                 (A12) 
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where Ȟ ؠ Ɋߠʹܪ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߤሻߠʹܮ ൌ ܧቀߠͳʹቁ. It is not straightforward to compare equations (A11) 
and (A12) with equations (A7) and (A8). In the CS model it is shown that the equilibrium 
price (markup) is higher when firms are externally financed than when they are internally 
financed. In this setting, firms are less interested in building market share because they 
earn less in some states of nature (the firm is liquidated in low-demand states).  
The cyclicality of price markups when firms are financially constrained is given by the 
following expression: 
 




ሺோି௖ሻ ቃ ൏ Ͳ (A13) 
or equivalently: 




ఎ ቃ ൏ Ͳ (A14) 
Thus, when firms are financially constrained markups are always countercyclical. 
Intuitively, during recessions, the possibility of liquidation makes firms care less about the 
future; they prefer extracting rents today by setting a higher price rather than building 
market shares to enhance future profits. 
Regarding the expected persistence of demand, its impact on markup cyclicality 
operates only through π2/1H and it can be shown that ߲ߣ ߲ߙΤ ൏ Ͳ. Thus, when the firm 
expects a booming period to persist in the future, the relative appeal of lowering current 
markups to reap profits in the future, rather than in the present, is stronger, thus 
reinforcing the degree of countercyclicality. 
Additionally, it is straightforward to show that ߲ߣ ߲ߥΤ ൏ Ͳ. The more procyclical is the 
elasticity of demand, the more countercyclical are price margins. Again, the intuition is the 
same as before: the more the elasticity of demand falls in slumps, the more firms become 
insulated from competition and the smaller becomes the gain in demand for a given price 
decrease. This reduces the benefit from investing in market shares (by cutting prices) 
during recessions.  
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Annex B: WDN survey questions about the main variables used in the 
empirical exercise 
x m = 1/0: 
NC.2.7_b How did the following factors evolve in your firm during 2010-2013?  
Prices (as compared to total costs): 
1=Strong decrease; 2=Moderate decrease; 3=Unchanged; 4=Moderate increase; 
5=Strong increase 
x fc = 1/0: 
C.2.3 With regard to finance, please indicate for 2010-2013 how relevant were for 
your firm each one of the following events? Note: credit here refers to any kind of credit, 
not only bank credit [1=Not relevant; 2=Of little relevance; 3=Relevant; 4=Very 
relevant] 
1. Credit was not available to finance: 
a. working capital 
b. new investment 
c. refinance debt 
2. Credit was available, but conditions (interest rate and other contractual terms) 
were too onerous to finance: 
a. working capital 
b. new investment 
c. refinance debt 
x low_demand = 1/0: 
C.2.6 How did [...] demand for your main product evolve during 2010-2013? 
[1=Strong decrease; 2=Moderate decrease; 3=Unchanged; 4=Moderate increase; 
5=Strong increase] 
a. Domestic demand for your main product/service 
b. Foreign demand for your main product/service 
x low_volat. = 1/0: 
C.2.1 How did the following factors affect you firm’s activity during 2010-2013? 
[1=Strong decrease; 2=Moderate decrease; 3=Unchanged; 4=Moderate increase; 
5=Strong increase] 
b. Volatility/uncertainty of demand for your products/services 
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x low_competition = 1/0: 
NC.5.5 Compared to the situation before 2008, how has the competitive pressure 
on your main product domestic and foreign markets changed in the period 2010-2013? 
[1=Strong decrease; 2=Moderate decrease; 3=Unchanged; 4=Moderate increase; 
5=Strong increase] 
a. Domestic market 
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